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Abstract 
   
The main purpose of this report is to assess Canada’s performance in attracting 
foreign direct investment inflows. The study reviews the literature on the benefits of FDI, 
analyses global and Canadian trends in FDI, identifies various factors affecting the inflow 
of FDI, and details how Canada ranks relative to other major OECD countries on the 
most influential factors.  Canada’s share of world FDI has fallen markedly since 1980. 
The report finds that this development reflects the opening of other countries to FDI 
rather than a hostile climate for FDI in this country. Indeed, there is no one factor that can 
be identified as seriously impeding the flow of FDI to Canada. The report identifies a 
number of areas where Canada can potentially improve its attractiveness to FDI, 
including possible changes to FDI regulation, a more competitive tax regime, better 
infrastructure, and certain improvements in the human capital area.Assessing Canada’s Ability to Compete for 
Foreign Direct Investment 
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The aim of this report is to assess Canada’s ability to compete for foreign direct 
investment (FDI). It examines global trends in foreign direct investment, analyze 
Canada’s performance in attracting such investment, and suggest ways to make Canada a 
more attractive destination for foreign capital.  Accordingly, section I discusses the 
theoretical underpinnings of the costs and benefits of FDI, and conditions necessary to 
maximize a country’s gain from inward FDI. Section II provides an overview of global 
and Canadian trends in FDI, assessing Canada’s relative performance in attracting foreign 
investment. The next section reviews the factors that affect inward FDI into a country. 
Section IV, the longest in the report, evaluates where Canada stands with respect to the 
factors influencing the decision of firms to undertake FDI. It does so by reviewing, 
among others, indicators of business environment and Canada’s position in world 
rankings as well as by providing an overview of FDI regulations in Canada, comparing 
the level of restrictions to other G7 members. Finally, section V concludes with possible 
government action to build on Canada’s existing advantages and develop new ones.   
 
The report finds that the post-1980 decline in Canada’s share of global FDI 
reflects the opening of other countries to FDI rather than a hostile climate for FDI in this 
country. Indeed, there is no one factor that can be identified as seriously impeding the 
flow of FDI to Canada. The report identifies a number of areas where Canada can 
potentially improve its attractiveness to FDI, including possible changes to FDI 
regulation, a more competitive tax regime, better infrastructure, and certain 
improvements in the human capital area. 
 
Key findings are highlighted below. 
 
Global and Canadian Trends in Foreign Direct Investment 
 
 
  In 2006, global FDI inflows reached $1,306 billion USD billion, the second highest 
level  ever  recorded  and  just  $135  billion  USD  short  of  the  peak  reached  in  2000. 
Increased  cross-border  mergers  and  acquisitions  (M&A)  activity  was  responsible  for 
much of the rise in global FDI.  These transactions rose significantly, both in number and 
value, approaching the previous M&A peak in 2000. 
  Canada performed rather poorly in terms of its long-term average annual growth rate 
of FDI stock over the period 1990-2006 compared to the U.S. and major country groups. 
As a result, Canada’s share of world FDI stock has declined over the period, going from 
6.3 per cent in 1990 (and 9.6 per cent in 1980), to 3.7 per cent in 2000, and 3.2 per cent in 
2006. iv 
 
  Canada’s performance in attracting FDI looks much better when one considers FDI 
inflows, rather than stocks.  Annual FDI inflows into Canada increased in absolute terms 
from  2002  to  2006,  from  $22.1  billion  USD  to  $66.6  billion  USD,  representing  a 
compound average annual growth rate of 31.7%, which was higher than the growth rate 
in many other countries.  
  Foreign acquisitions in Canada have risen both in value and number since 2003.  In 
2006 the value of foreign acquisitions in Canada reached $114 billion CAD – the highest 
value in the last decade.  
 
Canadian Performance in the Most Influential Factors Affecting FDI Inflows  
 
  Canada has the highest proportion of working-aged adults with post-secondary degrees  
among OECD countries, a positive factor for attracting FDI. 
 
  Labour productivity growth in Canada, compared to other major OECD countries, has 
been weak. In addition, Canadian business R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP is 
below average. It is however unclear how important this situation is for FDI location 
decisions. Foreign businesses can largely influence their own productivity and innovation 
performance since they organize the production process and control R&D spending. 
 
  Although Canada stands in good stead in terms of its physical infrastructure, there are 
some indications that its position may have slipped compared to some other countries. 
 
 
  The marginal effective tax rate on capital for large and medium sized corporations was 
30.9 per cent in 2007.  This is a high rate, although it is rapidly declining (down from 39 
per cent as recently at 2005) and is expected to decline more in the near term. 
 
 
  Canadian macroeconomic performance and public finances have been strong in recent 
years.  Despite a market currency appreciation, the Canadian economy experienced solid 





  The World  Bank report  Governance Matters  2007, taken together with the  Global 
Competitiveness Report 2006-2007 from the World Economic Forum, suggests that the 
problem with Canadian business regulation is not its level, but the time-consuming and 
bureaucratic nature of the process of compliance.   
 
 
  The quality of life in a country is an important, though often implicit determinant of 
FDI  location  choice.  Canada  has  consistently  scored  well  in  the  UNDP’s  human 




  The  World  Economic  Forum’s  Global  Competitiveness  Report,  which  takes  into 
account international attractiveness of countries to foreign investors, ranked Canada 16th 
out of 125 countries in the 2006-2007 report, down from 13th in the 2005-2006 report. 
Among G7 countries, France and Italy performed worse than Canada.  List of Charts and Summary Tables 
 
Chart 1:   FDI Inflows by Region, 1995-2005 (in billions of USD) 
Chart 1A:   Share of FDI Stock for Developed, Developing, and Transition 
Economies, 1980-2006 
Chart 1B:   Share of World FDI Stock for Selected Countries, 1980-2006 
Chart 2:   FDI Inflows in G7 Countries, 2002-2006 (Billions of USD) 
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2005 and 2006 
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The global business environment is changing. Increased economic integration and 
trade liberalization have given rise to a business model in which trade is increasingly 
confined to intermediate inputs, and investments are made around the world to tap into 
location-specific advantages.
2 Improvements in information and communications 
technologies and lowering of transport costs allow for each stage of production to be 
located anywhere in the world where it can be conducted most efficiently. It is therefore 
not surprising that foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows reached the second highest 
level ever recorded in 2006, with developed countries, developing countries, and 
transition economies all registering growth in inflows. While Canada has recovered from 
its FDI inflow slump in the period 2002-2004, its global share of FDI stock has declined 
significantly over the long-term. On the other hand, developing economies in Asia and 
Latin America, and Southern Europe along with CIS countries have all increased their 
share of world FDI stock. A key issue is whether our falling share of world FDI 
represents a failing on the part of Canada or rather a natural development associated with 
the opening up of investment opportunities in other countries. In any case, the challenge 
for Canada is to adapt to this new economic environment, and become the destination of 
choice for high-value activities within global supply chains, which is essential for the 
long-term prosperity of Canadians. 
 
The aim of this report is to assess Canada’s ability to compete for foreign direct 
investment (FDI). It examines global trends in foreign direct investment, analyzes 
Canada’s performance in attracting such investment, and suggests ways to make Canada 
a more attractive destination for foreign capital.  Accordingly, section I discusses the 
theoretical underpinnings of the costs and benefits of FDI and the conditions necessary to 
maximize a country’s gain from inward FDI. Section II provides an overview of global 
and Canadian trends in FDI, assessing Canada’s relative performance in attracting foreign 
investment. The next section reviews the factors that affect inward FDI into a country. 
Section IV, the longest in the report, evaluates where Canada stands with respect to the 
factors influencing the decision of firms to undertake FDI. It does so by reviewing, 
among others, indicators of business environment and Canada’s position in world 
rankings as well as by providing an overview of FDI regulations in Canada, comparing 
the level of restrictions to other G7 members. Finally, section V concludes with possible 
government action to build on Canada’s existing advantages and develop new ones.   
 
                                                 
1 The authors would like to thank Kellie Fong and Ron Hirschhorn from the Competition Policy Review Panel for 
comments on an earlier version of the paper and Alex Murray from the Centre for the Study of Living Standards for 
editorial assistance. 
2 A detailed discussion on the rise of global value chains is presented in DFAIT (2007).  2 
 
I. The Impact of Foreign Direct Investment 
 
  The importance of foreign direct investment (FDI) for long-term development is 
widely accepted among economists. Both economic theory and empirical evidence 
suggest that FDI has a beneficial impact on host countries through the generation of 
employment, the rising of productivity levels, the transfer of skills and technology, and 
the increase of exports. In addition to benefits, a number of potential costs of FDI have 
been identified, including loss of head office and ancillary functions, loss of sovereignty, 
loss of national icons, and less research and development. This section discusses both the 
benefits and costs that are thought to be associated with FDI. The objective of this section 
is not to provide a comprehensive assessment of the benefits and costs of FDI, but only to 
highlight the issues involved. 
 
A. Benefits of FDI 
 
  The benefits of FDI to host countries do not accrue automatically.  An enabling 
domestic business environment, which encourages both domestic and foreign investment 
and provides incentives for innovation and skills upgrading, is essential to reap the 
maximal benefit from FDI.  Factors that can hold back the realization of the benefits of 
FDI include low health and education levels in the labour force, weak competition, 
insufficient openness to trade, and inadequate regulatory frameworks in the host country.  
It is therefore useful to consider the potential benefits of FDI in the context of the 
environment that enable these benefits to be realized. 
 
 FDI and Growth: Most empirical studies find that FDI improves factor productivity 
and income growth in a host country, beyond what would be otherwise possible.  
However, the magnitude of this impact is generally difficult to assess empirically.  It is 
also unclear if the positive effects of FDI are dampened by a partial ―crowding out‖ of 
domestic investment.  Nevertheless, even when crowding out does take place, the net 
effect of FDI generally remains beneficial. 
 
 Trade and Investment: FDI integrates the host economy more closely into the world 
economy.  Trade and FDI tend to be mutually reinforcing channels for international trade, 
resulting in both higher imports and exports in the long-term.  A country’s ability to 
attract FDI depends significantly on the abilities of multinational enterprises (MNEs) to 
engage in import and export activities.  Host countries can attract FDI by following 
policies of regional trade liberalization and integration.   
 
 Technology Transfers: According to economic theory, technology transfer is the 
main channel through which FDI boosts productivity, both directly by the impact of the 
superior technology of the foreign investor on the host country’s productivity and 
indirectly through externalities created by the foreign investor in a host country. Such 
externalities related to technology transfer and diffusion work through several channels: 
linkages of foreign firms with suppliers and purchasers in the host country (vertical 
spillovers), linkages with competing or complementary firms in the same industry 
(horizontal spillovers), migration of skilled labour, and internationalization of R&D.  3 
 
Empirical literature finds stronger evidence for vertical spillovers than horizontal ones.  
A possible explanation for this may be the efforts by foreign enterprises to limit 
knowledge spillovers to competitors.  It is important to note that for technology transfer 
to create positive externalities, the technologies need to be relevant to the host country 
business sector.  Furthermore, evidence suggests that the ability of host-country 
enterprises to absorb the technology transferred via MNEs depends on their 
technological level not being substantially different from that of the foreign investors. 
 
 Human Capital Enhancement:  FDI affects human capital formation indirectly 
through host country government policies to attract FDI, and directly through the training 
opportunities provided by foreign enterprises.  Foreign enterprises may also enhance the 
human capital in other enterprises with which they develop links.  Investment in human 
capital is vital for creating an enabling environment for FDI.  However, it should be 
noted that the beneficial effects of FDI on human capital are a supplement to, not a 
replacement for, the overall efforts of a country to enhance the skill levels of the general 
population.  While empirical evidence shows that MNEs tend to provide more training 
and upgrading of workers than domestic firms, evidence of spillovers is much weaker.   
 
 Competition: FDI can spur competition in domestic markets, leading to higher 
productivity, lower prices, and a more efficient allocation of resources.  However, foreign 
investment taking the form of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) can increase market 
concentration, which can be anti-competitive.  In addition, evidence suggests that the 
magnitude and dispersion of spillovers from FDI on competition are likely to be 
positively related to prevailing levels of competition in the country.  Host-country 
governments should ensure that policies are in place to safe-guard a healthy degree of 
competition.  Trade liberalization, competition laws, and enforcement agencies can 
ensure that sufficient competition exists in the market, thereby protecting consumers. 
 
 Enterprise Development: FDI can promote enterprise development in the host 
country through efforts of MNEs to raise efficiency, reduce costs, and undertake new 
activities in the domestic enterprises they take over, as well as through synergies within 
the MNEs themselves.  In addition, efficiency gains may occur in unrelated enterprises 
through spillovers.  Foreign takeovers can lead to improvements in management and 
corporate governance, even in the privatization of government-owned enterprises, which 
have sometimes been politically controversial (usually due to short-run job losses as a 
result of restructuring). 
 
The above discussion indicates that the potential benefits from FDI to host 
countries can be substantial, but policies are required to ensure that these benefits are 
actually realized.  The magnitude of the benefits thus depends on host countries’ efforts 
to put in place an enabling environment for FDI - i.e. raising their level of technological, 
educational and infrastructural achievement enables countries to accrue larger benefits 
from FDI.  While the overall effect of FDI on enterprise development and productivity is 
usually positive, it may produce some adverse distributional and employment effects in 
the host country.  These problems are usually temporary, and policies that encourage 
labour market flexibility, create macroeconomic stability, and provide adequate legal and 4 
 
regulatory frameworks work to reduce the costs associated with these problems.  In this 
sense, FDI can further serve to reinforce the prevailing conditions in the host country, 
whether or not these conditions are desirable.  Therefore, sound policies that create an 
enabling domestic business environment are the key not only to mobilizing domestic 
resources, but also to maximizing the net benefit from FDI.
3 
 
B. Costs of FDI 
 
  Concerns  are  often  raised  about  certain  negative  impacts  of  FDI  on  the  host 
country. These concerns, which are generally more political and social than economic in 
nature,  are  much  more  associated  with  the  foreign  corporate  takeovers  than  with 
greenfield investments by foreign firms. 
 
  It is often argued that foreign corporate takeovers are bad for the host country as 
they result in the ―hollowing out‖ of the corporate headquarter functions and loss of the 
domestically-produced  business  and  professional  services  supplied  to  corporate 
headquarters. With the large number of foreign corporate takeovers in Canada in 2006 
and 2007, this issue has been prominent in public debate, and was a key factor leading to 
the creation of the Competition Policy Review Panel.  
 
  Many Canadians have expressed concern over the recent spate of takeovers of 
companies they consider ―national icons.‖ Some argue that foreign ownership and control 
of  these  companies  has  a  negative  impact  on  Canada’s  national  identity,  exerting  an 
emotional toll on the Canadian psyche. 
 
  Critics of FDI often assert that increased foreign ownership of Canadian assets 
erodes national sovereignty. It is argued that the business decisions of firms controlled by 
Canadians will be more congruent with the overall national interest than decisions by 
firms operating in Canada but controlled by foreigners, even though such decisions are in 
principle motivated by the financial interests of the shareholders, not national interests. 
 
  An additional drawback of FDI often cited in the FDI literature is the propensity 
of  MNCs  to  concentrate  R&D  in  their  home  country.  The  classic  example  of  such 
behaviour in the past has been the concentration of R&D undertaken by the Big Three 
auto makers in the United States. It should be noted however that there are examples of 
foreign-controlled firms that undertake significant R&D in host countries. 
 
  There is a vigorous debate about the merits of the above arguments. For example, 
a recent Conference Board of Canada (2008) study argues that the effects and extent of 
corporate  takeovers  are  largely  determined  by  the  business  decisions  taken  by  the 
acquirer  and  that  these  decisions  are  driven  by  the  business  strategy  considerations. 
Consequently, the nationality of the acquirer is less important to ―hollowing out‖ that the 
rationale for the acquisition, particularly the business strategy context. 
    
                                                 
3 An elaborate discussion on the costs and benefits of FDI and a review of the empirical evidence is found in OECD 
(2002).  5 
 
II. Recent Global and Canadian Trends in FDI 
 
  In the analysis of FDI,
4 it is important to always make a distinction between FDI 
flows and stocks. FDI flows refer to the amount of FDI that enters a country during a 
certain period, generally a calendar year. FDI stocks refer to the amount or value of FDI 
at a certain point in time, generally December 31. FDI flows accumulate over time to 
determine the FDI stock. 
 
    It is also important to distinguish gross and net flows. Gross inflows refer to the 
total amount of FDI that enters a country in a given year. But multinational firms can also 
liquidate their FDI in a host country and repatriate the proceeds to the home country. This 
is called gross FDI outflows from a country. Net FDI flows are defined as the difference 
between gross inflows and gross outflows. As gross inflows normally exceed gross 
outflows, net FDI flows are generally positive. But in certain years when there are large 
repatriations of FDI, net FDI flows can be negative (as they were for Canada in 2004). In 
international discussions of FDI, the most widely used source appears to be the FDI data 
base maintained by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD). In this section, data are provided for FDI flow estimates on a net basis. For 
international comparisons, UNCTAD data are used while Statistics Canada data are the 
main source for inward and outwards flows of FDI in Canada as they provide more 
detailed breakdowns.
5   
 
  FDI flows can be broken down into three distinct types: FDI arising from mergers 
and acquisitions, reinvested earnings by foreign-controlled firms, and ―other,‖ which 
includes greenfield investments. The motivation and effects of the three types of FDI can 
differ significantly so it is always important to be aware of these distinctions in FDI 
investment. As a general rule, there is much more controversy about the relative benefits 
and costs from FDI inflows associated with corporate takeovers than from FDI inflows 
associated with the reinvestment of earnings and greenfield investments.     
 
In order to identify Canada’s areas of strength and weakness in terms of FDI 
attractiveness, it is important to first assess Canada’s FDI performance in recent years. 
This section first provides an overview of global trends in FDI.  It then focuses on trends 
in Canada by: (i) reviewing the recent evolution of FDI stocks and flows in Canada; (ii) 
assessing the importance of foreign mergers and acquisitions in Canada to recent FDI 
trends; (iii) identifying the major contributing countries and the sectors most targeted by 
FDI; and (iv) reviewing trends in Canadian direct investment abroad.  
 
                                                 
4 Statistics Canada defines FDI to include all investments of  ―resident entities‖ based in countries other than Canada 
obtaining a lasting interest in an enterprise resident in Canada. It notes that in practice direct investment is deemed to 
occur when a foreign company owns at least 10 per cent of the voting equity in a Canadian enterprise. 
5 UNCTAD and Statistics Canada estimates on FDI are identical if appropriates PPPs conversion rates are used. 
UNCTAD data can be found in Tables 1, 2 and 3 while statistics Canada data can be found in Tables 4-13. 6 
 
A. Global Trends 
 
i. Trends in FDI flows 
 
Since 2000, foreign direct investment flows have been at significantly higher 
levels than in any other period since 1970 (Table 1).
6  In 2006, global FDI inflows, 
expressed in nominal prices, reached $1,306 billion USD, the second highest level ever 
recorded and just $135 billion USD short of the peak of $1,441 billion USD reached in 
2000 (Chart 1).  All major country groups – developed countries, developing countries, 
and transition economies – saw strong growth in FDI inflows in 2006, the most recent 
year for which data are available.   
 
The lion’s share of FDI has always taken place within the developed world. For 
example, in 2006, the developed countries accounted for 66 per cent of FDI inflows, 
compared to 29 per cent for developing countries, and 5 per cent for transition economies 
(Southeast Europe and CIS). The EU remained the largest host region for FDI, 
accounting for 41 per cent.   
 
Growth in FDI flows to developed countries has been particularly robust in recent 
years, up 16 per cent in 2004, 40 per cent in 2005 and 46 per cent in 2006. This follows 
consecutive falls in FDI inflows to developed countries in 2001, 2002 and 2003. Indeed, 
FDI inflows to developed countries in 2003 were down 75 per cent from the 2000 level.  
The United States was the world’s largest FDI recipient in 2006, with a net inflow of 
$175 billion USD, followed by the United Kingdom ($140 billion USD) and France ($81 
billion USD). Canada had the fifth largest FDI inflow, at $69 billion USD, after the three 
G-7 countries already mentioned and China.   
 
FDI inflows to developing countries have also been very robust in recent years, up 
21 per cent in 2006, 22 per cent in 2005, and an astounding 48 per cent in 2004. 
Developing countries in Asia and Oceania maintained their strong attraction of foreign 
investment in 2006, garnering 72 per cent of total inflows to all developing countries 
since 2003. 
 
But it is the transition economies, defined as Southeast Europe and the CIS 
countries, that have experienced the most rapid growth in FDI, admittedly from a small 
base. FDI to these economies increased over 400 per cent over the last four years, from 
$13 billion USD in 2002 to $69 billion USD in 2006. 
  
Increased cross-border M&A activity was responsible for the more than doubling 
of global FDI since 2003 (UNCTAD 2007).  These transactions rose significantly, both in 
number and value, approaching the previous M&A peak in 2000.  This world M&A 
boom was driven by high stock market valuations, rising profits and favourable financing 
conditions.  In North America, the value of M&A sales almost doubled in 2006, mainly 
due to high value deals concluded in the natural resources industry in Canada.  In Europe 
the value of cross border M&A deals remained higher than in North America in 2006, 
                                                 
6 All tables are found at the end of the report. 7 
 
and grew by 9 per cent.  The United Kingdom was the main target country in Europe, 
with 3 of the 5 largest cross-border M&A deals world-wide being acquisitions of UK 




ii. Trends in FDI stocks 
 
  Following from the large increases in FDI flows, the world stock of FDI has 
ballooned in the past quarter century. Expressed in nominal US dollars, the world FDI 
stock more than tripled in the 1980s from $551 billon USD in 1980 to $1,779 billion 
USD in 1990; again more than tripled in the 1990s to $5,810 billion USD in 2000; and 
more than doubled in the first six years of the 2000s to $11,999 billion USD ($12 trillion 
dollars) in 2006 (Table 2). The value of the world FDI stock in 2006 was around 22 times 
greater in 2006 than 1980, an average annual growth rate of 12.6 per cent. Growth in the 
world stock of FDI has been particularly strong since 2002, with annual increases of 21 
per cent in 2003, 17 per cent in 2004, 5 per cent in 2005, and 19 per cent in 2006.   
 
  It is often thought that massive FDI flows to the developing world have been 
driving the growth in the world FDI stock. But in reality the developing countries’ share 
of world FDI has been remarkably stable, at 25.5 per cent in 1980 and 26.3 per cent in 
2006 (Table 2a and Chart 1A). The FDI share of the developed countries has fallen 
somewhat, from 74.5 per cent of the world total in 1980 to 70.5 per cent in 2006. But it 
has been the transition economies, defined as the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) and South-east Europe, but excluding China, who have largely made up for the fall 
in the developed country  world FDI share. Their share increased from essentially zero in 
1980 to 3.2 per cent in 2006.  8 
 
    
 
 
  World FDI shares for G-7 countries have been fairly stable over the 1980-2006 
period, except for Canada. There were small increases in the world FDI share for France 
(from 4.8 per cent in 1980 to 6.5 per cent in 2006), Italy (1.6 per cent to 2.5 per cent), and 
Japan (0.5 per cent to 0.9 per cent). On the other hand, there were small decreases in 
shares for Germany (6.7 per cent to 4.2 per cent), the United Kingdom (11.4 per cent to 
9.5 per cent, and the United States (15.1 per cent to 15.0 per cent). All these changes 
were minor compared to developments for Canada, whose world FDI share fell 6.6 
percentage points, or by two-thirds, from 9.8 per cent in 1980 to 3.2 per cent in 2006 





  While the world FDI stock in the developing world was relatively stable between 
1980 and 2006, there have been important shifts within the area. In particular, Africa has 
seen its world FDI share plummet from 7.2 per cent in 1980 to 2.6 per cent in 2006. This 
was largely offset by the rise of Asia’s share from 11.9 per cent to 16.1 per cent. The 
share of Latin America and the Caribbean also rose from 6.4 per cent to 7.6 per cent.  
Within Asia, Hong Kong and China accounted for the rise in the Asian share of world 
FDI; Hong Kong saw its share rise from 3.8 per cent in 1980 to 6.6 per cent in 2006, and 
China experienced an increase from 0.2 per cent to 2.4 per cent (Chart 1B). Given the 
small size of Hong Kong, it is interesting to note that its stock of world FDI is more than 
double that of Canada!     
     
B. FDI Trends in Canada 
 
  Global trends in FDI clearly point to an unprecedented increase in cross-border 
investment. In this context, it is important to determine if Canada is playing a leading role 
in these worldwide trends or if it instead is a relatively minor player. Indeed, why has 
Canada’s share of the world FDI stock been cut by two thirds over the last quarter 
century? For that reason, this section reviews trends in inward FDI to Canada from both 
historical and international perspectives.  
 
i. Canada’s FDI Flows and Stocks 
 
As noted, FDI performance can be assessed in terms of both flows and stocks. 
While the former are a good indication of recent development in and/or changing 
incentives to foreign investment, the latter provide a longer term picture of incentives to 
invest in a given country. Given the volitality of FDI inflows, an assessment of Canada’s 
ability to attract FDI is extremely sensitive to the period chosen. For example, based on 
developments since 2002, Canada’s performance in attracting FDI flows appears 
impressive. Annual net FDI inflows into Canada increased threefold in absolute terms 
from 2002 to 2006, from $22.2 billion USD to $69.0 billion USD, representing a 
compound average annual growth rate of 32.9 per cent (Table 1 and Chart 2). Canada 
experienced much higher growth than most other G7 countries over that period, including 
Italy (28.1 per cent), the United States (23.9 per cent), France (13.4 per cent), Germany  
(-5.4 per cent) and Japan, which recorded negative net FDI inflows in 2006.  Canada’s 
growth over the 2002-2006 period was also well above the world average (20.4 per cent) 
and outpaced many developing countries such as China (7.1 per cent), India (31.6 per 
cent), Korea (9.9 per cent), Brazil (3.2 per cent) and Mexico (-0.4 per cent). 
 
However, if one uses the year 2000 as a base, Canada has performed much less 
well, with FDI inflows in 2006 essentially unchanged from the year 2000, given the 






Recently released Statistics Canada data for 2007 show that the net flow of FDI 
into Canada, expressed in current Canadian dollars, jumped a massive 47 per cent in 
2007, rising to $115 billion from $78 billion in 2006 (Table 4) 
 
In terms of the absolute level of FDI inflows (not adjusting for the size of the 
economy), Canada’s FDI performance in 2006 is far from poor in comparison to other 
countries.  Canada ranked 4
th among the G7 in the size of its FDI inflow despite having 
the smallest economy of the group, and recorded higher levels of net FDI inflows than all 
developing economies with the exception of China, which received an almost identical 
amount of FDI ($69.5 billion USD). 
 
Despite Canada’s apparent strong performance in attracting FDI, the United 
Nations Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) points out in its World 
Investment Report 2007 that, in comparison to its potential, Canada is in fact 
underperforming.  The report ranks countries’ FDI progress by constructing two indices – 
the inward FDI performance index and the inward FDI potential index.  The FDI 
performance index measures the extent to which a host country receives inward FDI 
relative to its economic size (calculated as the ratio of a country’s share in global FDI 
inflows to its share in global GDP).  The FDI potential index reflects country-specific 
structural variables which affect inward FDI and which do not generally change from 
year to year.  In 2006, Canada ranked 79
th out of 141 countries in terms of its FDI 
performance (based on the inward FDI index), while it ranked 4
th in terms of its potential 
(Table 23).  Thus, there is a significant gap between Canada’s actual FDI performance 
and its potential FDI performance.  Moreover, while Canada’s absolute level of FDI 11 
 
inflows is relatively high compared to other economies in the world, when its FDI 
inflows are adjusted for the size of its economy (share of world GDP) it ranks quite low.   
  
               
      
In terms of the absolute ability of Canada to attract and retain FDI, measured as 
the inward FDI stock/GDP ratio, Canada does fair well. Among G-7 countries, Canada in 
2006 had the third highest FDI/GDP ratio at 30 per cent, below only the United Kingdom 
(48 per cent), and France (35 per cent).    
 
But in terms of the relative ability of Canada to attract FDI, it appears that Canada 
has been losing ground. Indeed, even though Canada’s inward FDI stock as a share of 
GDP increased 50 per cent over the 1990-2006 period from 20 per cent to 30 per cent of 
GDP (Chart 3 and Table 3), all other G-7 countries experienced larger increases in per 
cent terms and all other G-7 countries except the United States and Japan experienced 
larger increases in percentage point terms. Inward FDI stock as a share of GDP increased 
fivefold in France, three fold in Italy and Japan (admittedly from a very low base in this 
country), more than doubled in Germany and the United Kingdom, and doubled in the 
United States.  
 
Canada poor performance in the growth of the FDI stock/GDP ratio over the 
1990-2006 period was due to the relatively poor performance in terms of growth in FDI 
stock, with an average annual growth rate of only 8.0 per cent.  Even if we do not 
consider South East Europe and CIS countries, where FDI inflows naturally took off after 12 
 
the fall of communism, Canada still did poorly relative to Asia (16.2 per cent), the 




Canada’s share of world FDI stock has also declined in the long-term, going from 
9.8 per cent in 1980 to 6.3 per cent in 1990, 3.7 per cent in 2000, and 3.2 per cent in 2006 
(Table 2, Chart 5).  This should not be surprising, as Asia and Oceania, Latin America 
and the Caribbean, Southern Europe along with CIS countries and the European Union, 
all significantly increased their share of world FDI stock between 1990 and 2006. 
 
The drastic fall in Canada’s share of the world FDI stock since 1980 has received 
much attention in this country. Some see this development as a manifestation of Canada’s 
declining ability to attract FDI and a major problem or challenge for the Canadian 
economy, although the factor that triggered this development is generally not specified. 
Others are more sanguine and see the decline as a more natural development. They note 
that it has not been the absolute level of Canada’s FDI stock that has declined as FDI 
growth has averaged 8 per cent per year between 1990 and 2006. Rather it is that the FDI 
stock growth has been much faster in other countries. It is argued that this development 
reflected the massive growth of FDI to other economies as these economies opened to the 
world.  
 
Already in the immediate postwar period Canada was a major destination of FDI, 
with this country’s world FDI share well above its GDP share. Unlike many other 
countries at the time, Canada was open to FDI. After 1980 the rest of the world opened to 
FDI. The reduction of investment barriers in the EU meant EU firms invested more in 
other EU countries. The fall of communism opened up the former Soviet bloc to 
international capital. The adoption of more market-oriented policies in many developing 
countries, especially in Asia, led to large inflows of FDI to these areas. 13 
 
 
From this perspective, it is unrealistic to have expected Canada to have retained 
its 1980 share of world FDI (9.8 per cent). Indeed, given the massive growth in the world 
FDI stock over the last quarter century, if Canada had retained its 1980 share of world 
FDI in 2006, its FDI/GDP  ratio would have been 90 per cent instead of 30 per cent. The 
extent of foreign control of the Canadian economy would have been much greater. 




ii. Mergers and Acquisitions 
 
FDI captures investments in the form of mergers and acquisitions (M&A), 
reinvested earnings and other investments including greenfield investment. Mergers and 
acquisitions are of particular interest because these investments are often the target of 
criticism; they raise fears of a hollowing out of Canadian businesses. According to the 
Financial Post Crosbie estimates, foreign acquisitions in Canada have risen both in value 
and number since 2003 (Chart 6, Table 6).
7  In 2006, the value of foreign acquisitions in 
Canada reached $114,091 million CAD– the highest value recorded over the last decade 
(Table 6).
8  On the other hand, the number of transactions has declined compared to the 
last M&A peak in 2000, signifying an increase in high-value takeovers in Canada.  
According to data from Statistics Canada, the share of foreign acquisitions in FDI inflows 
has increased since the slump in 2003, going from 6.7 per cent of FDI inflows in 2003, to 
                                                 
7 There exist two different sources for estimates of the value of M&A in Canada. The Financial Post Crosbie (FPC) 
publishes estimates of the number of deals and their value while Statistics Canada provides official estimates of FDI 
inflows broken into M&A, reinvested earnings and other FDI. While both sources show similar trends, FPC estimates 
tend to be significantly larger than Statistics Canada estimates. Table 5a shows that recent trends for M&A are similar 
for both sources. The Competition Policy Review Panel Consultation Paper (2007) Sharpening Canada’s Competitive 
Edge uses both sources for assessing the level of M&A in Canada. 
8 FPC preliminary estimates suggest another significant increase in 2007, with M&A deals in Canada easily in excess 
of 155 billion CAD.  14 
 
approximately 58.1 per cent of FDI inflows in 2006 (Table 6). Over the 2001-2006 
period, 36.5 per cent of all FDI inflows were accounted for by M&A.  Canadian 
investment abroad has been slightly less driven by M&A activity, with M&A investments 
abroad accounting for only 31 per cent of the average outward FDI between 2001 and 
2006 (Table 11).  The difference was starker in 2006, with M&A accounting for 58.1 per 




The recent increase in FDI in Canada in the form of M&As, and foreign takeovers 
of prominent Canadian firms such as Falconbridge, Inco, and the Hudson’s Bay 
Company, has fuelled debate over whether Canada is being disproportionately affected by 
the global increase in M&A activity.  However, data from Financial Post Crosbie: 
Mergers and Acquisitions do not support this view, showing that between 2001-2006 
Canadian companies acquired 1,993 foreign firms at a combined value of approximately 
$300 billion CAD, and that over the same period, 864 Canadian companies were acquired 
by foreign firms at a combined value of $286 billion (CPRP, 2007). It is also important to 
keep in mind that annual M&A activity tends to fluctuate sharply from year to year, and 
can be considerably affected by a few high-value transactions.  The recent high profile 






iii. Foreign Direct Investment by Sector and Country 
 
There are significant differences across sectors in the prominence of FDI flows 
and stocks (Table 7-9, Chart 7).
9  Overall, 36.5 per cent of FDI stock in Canada was in the 
manufacturing industry at the end of 2006, down from 48.4 per cent in 2000 (Table 8).  
The mining and oil and gas extraction industry increased its share of FDI stock from 15.1 
per cent in 2005 to 16.2 per cent in 2006, and up from 8.5 per cent in 1999.  The finance 
and insurance industry also held a significant portion of the FDI stock, 12.2 per cent in 
2006.  Over the period 2002-2006, both the finance and insurance industry, and the 
services and retailing industry registered strong annual growth rates of 6.2 per cent and 
10.0 per cent respectively. The mining and oil and gas extraction industry posted the 
highest annual growth rate over this period, at 12.3 per cent. In 2006, the bulk of FDI 
stock in Canada still was in the manufacturing sector, followed by mining and oil and gas 
extraction, finance and insurance, and services and retailing. However, the manufacturing 
sector is declining in importance, with FDI in mining and oil and gas extraction, services 
and retailing, and finance growing rapidly. 
 
While many countries have stakes in the FDI stock in Canada, a very large portion 
of it is accounted for by only a few countries (Table 10). As shown in Chart 8, the United 
States accounts for the bulk of the FDI stock in Canada (68 per cent).  The U.S. FDI stock 
in Canada is fairly evenly distributed among sectors, with energy and metallic minerals 
                                                 
9 FDI stocks by industry are available from Statistics Canada on both a North American Industry Classification System 
(NAICS) basis and on a 1980 Standards Industrial Classification (SIC) basis. FDI flows and only available on a 1980 
SIC basis.  16 
 
and the ―all other industries‖ category making up 27.6 per cent of U.S. holdings, followed 
by finance and insurance at 17.8 per cent, and then machinery and equipment at 12.1 per 
cent. Only three other countries, the United Kingdom (8.7 per cent), France (6.6 per cent) 




iv. Canadian Direct Investment Abroad 
 
While not the focus of this study, it is interesting to note that Canada has been a 
net exporter of capital (in the form of FDI) since 1996 (Table 8 and Table 13). Indeed, 
from 1996 until recently, the overall stock of Canadian direct investment abroad has been 
higher than that of foreign direct investment in Canada.  Between 1997 and 2006, the 
ratio of FDI stock in Canada to the stock of Canadian direct investment abroad has 
hovered between a trough of 81.9 per cent in 2002 and a peak of 90.6 per cent in 2003. At 
the end of 2006, the total stock of Canadian direct investment abroad was $523 billion 
CAD whereas the total FDI stock in Canada was $449 billion CAD. This situation 
represented a significant break with the historical reality of Canada as a net importer of 
capital since as late as in 1988 the stock of FDI in Canada was still 43 per cent larger than 
that of Canadian direct investment abroad. Yet, it must be noted that these development 
are in large part the result of significant increases in Canadian direct investment abroad 
rather than that of a slowdown in FDI growth.
 10  The large FDI inflows in 2007 have 
resulted in Canada again returning to a position where FDI in Canada exceeds Canadian 
FDI abroad.
                                                 
10 A more detailed discussion of Canadian direct investment abroad is found in the discussion paper produced by the 
Competition Policy Review Panel Consultation (2007). 17 
 
 
III. Factors that Determine FDI 
 
  The factors that affect FDI can be broadly divided into two general areas: first, 
those that are fundamental drivers or rationales for FDI decisions and second, those 
associated with the environment that enables or facilitates FDI.  
 
  Three fundamental drivers or rationales for a firm to make a direct investment 
outside its home country can be identified: to take advantage of a local market; to exploit 
natural resources; and to make use of human resources in the host country in production 
processes. One or a combination of the following motives influences a firm’s direct 
investment abroad: 
 
(a) Market Seeking: One motivation for firms to invest abroad is access to larger or 
faster-growing markets, or markets in which there is less competition than the 
home country. The existence of trade barriers has historically motivated firms to 
establish operations outside their home country to take advantage of local 
markets. For example, in the first half of the 20
th century US firms such as the Big 
Three auto companies established production operations in Canada to get behind 
tariff barriers and sell their products in Canada. It should be noted that the market 
access sought by multinationals may go beyond the local market of the host 
country to include markets with preferential access from the host country. For 
example, Japanese auto companies have made direct investments in Canada to 
produce vehicles for the US market which is open to Canadian-based producers 
under NAFTA and US firms have invested in Ireland to gain access to the EU 
market. With trade liberalization, this motivation is of declining importance 
today.  
 
(b) Resource Seeking: Firms also invest abroad to exploit natural resources (usually 
for export markets) that are not readily or cheaply available in the home country. 
Manufacturing firms such as chemical producers  that use natural resources may 
also invest abroad to set up plants close to the natural resources that are used in 
the production process. Canada has traditionally attracted FDI in the primary 
sector due to its rich natural resource base. Natural resources continue to be the 
driving force in inward FDI into Canada, and with the rise in commodity prices, 
this rationale for FDI is increasing. 
 
(c) Efficiency Seeking: Firms may invest abroad in order to take advantage of the 
relative strengths of countries in a way that minimizes their costs. For example, a 
firm’s strategy may include taking advantage of cheap labour in one country for 
certain parts of the production process, and utilizing highly qualified workers in 
another country for different elements of the production process. Efficiency 
seeking is becoming an increasingly important determinant of FDI, evidenced by 





Summary Table 1: Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment 
I.  Fundamental Drivers (Economic Conditions) 
(a) Markets: size, growth potential, income levels, proximity to important regional 
markets, urbanization, demand patterns. 
(b)  Resources:  natural  resources  availability,  location  of  resources,  costs  of 
exploring and exploiting resources. 
(c)    Competitiveness:  labour  costs,  labour  productivity,  availability  of  skilled 
labour, scale of production, physical infrastructure, and level of technology, country 
comparative advantage 
II. Enabling Factors (Government Policies) 
(a)  Macroeconomic Environment:  price stability, growth, employment, exchange 
rates 
(b) Promotion of Private Enterprise: tax system, efficiency of the financial sector, 
foreign trade zones, labour or capital subsidies. 
(c)  Trade  Policies:  openness in foreign trade, regional integration and access to 
regional markets 
(d)  Regulation:  regulatory  frameworks  with  respect  to  competition,  financial 
reporting, IPR, labour market (EPL and labour tax wedges); regulatory burden in 
terms of time and cost. 
(e) FDI Regulations: level of FDI restrictions, non-discrimination between foreign 
and domestic enterprise, transparent and stable policies. 
(f)  Good Governance and Quality of Life 
 
  Summary Table 1 provides a detailed listing of the host country determinants of 
FDI. These are grouped into two categories Economic Conditions and Government 
Policies. Economic Conditions essentially outline the three motivating factors for FDI 
discussed above.  Government Policies outline the rules and regulations in a country, 
which provide an enabling environment for investment. Accordingly, the next section of 
the report discusses the most influential factors that affect the inflows of FDI, and 




IV. Where Canada Stands with Respect to the Factors that 
Affect FDI Inflows 
 
  This section of the report discusses the current state of Canada’s attractiveness as 
a locus for foreign direct investment in terms of both fundamental drivers and enabling 
factors. To facilitate presentation, the factors have been divided into two sets: factors 
where Canada is doing well and factors where Canada is doing less well. It should be 
stressed that the factors lie on a continuum and the boundary between the list of factors 
where Canada is doing well and less well is arbitrary. In terms of the factors where 
Canada is doing less well, the assessment is made relative to other factors and not other 
countries. Compared to other countries, Canada may be doing well.  Moreover, even for 
the factors where Canada is assessed to be doing well, there is still room for 
improvement.  
 
  The areas where Canada is assessed to be performing well are: natural resource 
base; human resources; governance; macroeconomic performance; labour market 
flexibility; government finances; general business environment; and quality of life. 
  
  The areas where Canada is assessed to be doing less well from the point of view 
of attracting FDI are: productivity performance; innovation performance; exchange rate; 
infrastructure; taxes; and FDI regulation.  
    
A. Canada’s Relative Strengths 
 
i. Natural Resource Base 
   
  Canada’s traditional advantage in attracting foreign direct investment has been its 
rich natural resource base related to our extensive land mass, the second largest in the 
world. With the rise in world commodity prices related to growing demand for 
commodities in developing countries, particularly in Asia, this relative advantage has 
become even more important.  
 
  As noted earlier in the report, the surge in FDI inflows to Canada since 2004 has 
been mainly driven by investment in the natural resource sector, a trend which is likely to 
continue in the foreseeable future (DFAIT, 2007). In 2005, net FDI flows in energy and 
metallic minerals totaled $21.9 billion CAD (Table 7). This increased to $46.5 billion in 
2006 and $65.2 billion in 2007. Energy and metallic minerals FDI, defined on the 1980 
SIC basis, accounted for 62.5 per cent of net FDI inflows in 2005, 59.4 per cent in 2006, 
and 56.5 per cent in 2007 (Table 7a).  
 
  Canada is and remains a choice location for mineral exploration, much of it done 
by foreign-controlled firms. The Prospectors and Developers of Canada estimates that in 
2007 Canada accounted for 19-20 per cent of worldwide exploration spending (Koven, 
2008), well above its share of world land mass and mineral production. 
 20 
 
  It should be noted that Canada is a world leader in mining technology and that 
Canadian firms such as Inco, Noranda, Falconbridge, and Alcan have operations 
throughout the world. The inward FDI associated with the takeover of these Canadian 
natural resource companies by foreigners thus includes the acquisition of the Canadian-
controlled assets abroad of these corporations as well as the assets located in Canada. 
 
  Following from the increased FDI inflows in the natural resource sector, the share 
of energy and metallic minerals in Canada’s total FDI stock has also risen markedly. It 




  Despite the attractiveness of Canada as a location for FDI in the natural resource 
sector, it should be noted that this advantage is not absolute and can be eroded.  The cost 
of exploring for and developing new natural resource deposits in Canada has increased 
significantly in recent years (Conference Board of Canada, 2004). The cost overruns in 
oil sand projects are an example of this trend. Developing natural resources in Canada 
can also be difficult given the unsettled nature of many Aboriginal land claims and 
stringent environmental regulations. Other countries also have great potential for natural 
resources development, and at lower costs. Canada should not take for granted its 
attractiveness as a location for FDI in the natural resource sector. 
 
ii. Human Resources  
 
  An important OECD study on FDI found that a high level of human capital tends 
to attract inward FDI (Nicoletti et al., 2003:44). The quality of Canadian human resources 
is in general high, which makes Canada an attractive location for FDI that needs a well-
educated workforce. Indeed, Canada’s greatest competitive advantage in the human 
resources area is the proportion of working-aged adults (25-to-64 year-old population) 
with tertiary education. At 46 per cent in 2005, this proportion was highest among OECD 
countries (see Summary Table 2 below), although these estimates do suffer from 21 
 
definitional issues.
11 If we focus on all postsecondary education, Canada’s advantage on 




Canadian students have also done extremely well in the PISA International 
Student Assessment tests (OECD, 2007c). In the most recent survey conducted in 2006 
(Table 14), Canadian students ranked second among 30 OECD countries in science (after 
Finland), and third in reading and mathematics (after Korea and Finland).  
 
Canada did quite well in the International Adult Literacy Survey conducted 
between 1994 and 1998 (OECD, 2000). For the 22 jurisdictions for which results are 
                                                 
11 The 1997 International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) used by the OECD divides post-secondary 
education into three levels, i.e. Level 4, Level 5 and Level 6 (UNESCO, 1997).  Level 4 refers to post-secondary, non 
tertiary education and captures programmes that straddle the boundary between upper-secondary and post-secondary 
education from an international point of view, even though they might clearly be considered as upper-secondary or 
post-secondary programmes in a national context.  Level 5 includes tertiary education programmes which do not lead 
directly to the award of an advanced research qualification. It includes both programmes which are theoretically 
based/research preparatory (history, philosophy, mathematics, etc.) or giving access to professions with high skills 
requirements (e.g. medicine, dentistry, architecture, etc.), and those programmes which are 
practical/technical/occupationally specific. The first type is classified as Level 5A while the second is classified as 
Level 5B. Finally, Level 6 is reserved for tertiary programmes which lead to the award of an advanced research 
qualification and are therefore devoted to advanced study and original research and are not based on course-work only. 
For many countries including Canada, Level 6 data are not recorded separately but instead included in Level 5A. In 
Canada, the Labour Force Survey does not allow for a clear delineation between Level 4 and Level 5B which, 
according to the OECD, leads to inflated estimates for Level 5B estimates. One must therefore be careful when 
comparing Canadian data on tertiary education (Level 5 and Level 6) with that of other countries. This problem can be 
avoided by comparing data on overall postsecondary educational attainment (Levels 4, 5 and 6) or by focusing on what 
is commonly called university level educational attainment (Level 5A and Level 6). 22 
 
available, Canada ranked 5
th in terms of prose literacy in mean score, 8
th in document 
literacy, and 9
th for quantitative literacy (Table 15). In terms of the proportion of the 
population at the top literacy level (level 4/5), Canada ranked second in prose literacy, 4
th 
in document literacy, and 8
th in quantitative literacy of 22 countries (Table 15a).  
 
Summary Table 2: Educational Attainment in 2005 for Selected OECD 
Countries and Regions 
  Percentage of Working-Aged 
Population (25-64 years) 
Percentage of University Graduates 
(20-64 years old) 
  Tertiary 
Education 
University Degrees 







Canada  46  23  12  11 
Japan   40  22  n/a  14 
United States  39  30  n/a  n/a 
United Kingdom  30  21  18  11 
France   25  15  15  10 
Germany  25  15  8  22 
Italy  12  12  12  n/a 
EU 19  24  17  n/a  n/a 
OECD  26  19  11  14 
Symbol n/a denotes missing data 
Source: Education at a Glance: OECD Indicators 2007 
 
 
In recognition of Canada’s record in delivering a high quality of education to 
children and youth outlined above, the Conference Board of Canada (2007) in its report 
card of Canada’s performance gave Canada an A in education and skills. 
 
Of course, there are aspects of human resources where Canada performs less well. 
For example, the distribution of university graduates in Canada is generally skewed 
towards social sciences, arts and humanities rather than towards science and engineering. 
Indeed, Canada had a lower proportion of its university graduates in science and 
engineering than many European countries (such as Finland, Belgium, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy and the U.K.), and also had a much lower proportion of working-aged adults 
with university degrees than the United States (Summary Table 2). In fact, Canada only 
ranks sixth in the OECD in terms of university graduates with 23.3 per cent of working-
aged adults with university degrees, 7.0 percentage points behind first place Norway (30.3 
per cent)  and 6.3 percentage points behind second place United States (29.6 per cent) 
(Chart 11). Workplace training also appears to be less developed in Canada than in other 
countries. 
 
Because of these deficiencies, some have suggested that Canada lacks the level of 
competencies required to be an attractive destination for the production of high value-
added elements in the global supply chains of MNEs, although this is a moot point. 23 
 
 
  The Global Competitiveness Report 2006-2007, produced by the World 
Economic Forum, ranked Canada 17
th out of 125 countries in higher education and 
training, behind countries such as Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Belgium, Norway, United 
States, Singapore, United Kingdom, France and Japan, to name a few.  The composite 
indicator was based on eight sub-components. In terms of these variables, Canada ranked 
15
th in the gross secondary enrolment rate; 27
th for tertiary enrolment rate; 14
th in the 
quality of the educational system, defined as the ability to meet the needs of a competitive 
economy; 22
nd in terms of the quality of math and science education; 4
th in the quality of 
management schools; 13
th in the local availability of specialized research and training 
services; 24
th in the extent of staff training; and 9
th in the quality of public schools. All 
these assessment are based on survey data except the first two which are based on hard 
data. This may account for Canada’s poorer showing compared to OECD data on post-







Governance has been defined as "rules, processes and behaviour that affect the 
way in which powers are exercised…. particularly as regards openness, participation, 
accountability, effectiveness and coherence" (European Commission, 2001). There are a 
number of international studies of governance indicators and Canada does well on all of 
them.   
  24 
 
For example, the World Bank report Governance Matters 2007 identifies six 
dimensions of governance and develops empirical estimates for 212 countries (World 
Bank, 2007): 
 
  Voice and accountability - measures the extent to which the citizens of a county are 
able to participate in selecting their government, including freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, and free media;  
 
  Political stability and absence of violence - measures the perceptions of the likelihood 
that the government will be destabilized or toppled through unconstitutional or violent 
means, including terrorism; 
 
  Government effectiveness – measures the quality of public services, the quality of civil 
service and its degree of independence from political pressure, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment 
to those policies; 
 
  Regulatory quality - measures the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement both sound policies and regulations that promote private sector 
development; 
 
  Rule of law – measures the confidence of a country’s citizens in the rule of law and the 
extent to which they abide by it, with particular emphasis on the quality of contract 
enforcement, courts, police, and the likelihood of crime and violence; 
 
  Control of corruption – measures the extent to which public power is used for private 
gain.  It includes petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as the capture of the 
state by elites and private interests.  
 
Canada scored very well in all six dimensions of governance.  Among G-7 
nations, Canada ranked first in three areas (government effectiveness, the rule of law, and 
the control of corruption) and second in three areas (voice and accountability, regulatory 
quality, and political stability and absence of violence). Canada was among the top 10 per 
cent of 212 countries in all dimensions, except in political stability and the absence of 
violence, where it ranked among countries in the 75
th to 90
th percentile.   
 
In contrast to the stellar performance in the World Bank report, Canada did not 
rank quite as high in the governance measures contained in the Global Competitiveness 
Report 2006-2007, produced by the World Economic Forum. It ranked 21
st out of 125 
countries in institutions, a broad measure of governance. A total of 29 sub-components or 
variables make up this index, with all indicators derived from survey data. In terms of 
these variables, Canada’s ranking ranged from 9
th to 74
th.
12 Canada’s relative poorer 
                                                 
12 Canada ranked 9
th in centralization of economic policy making; 10
th in freedom of the press; 11
th in the 
protection of  minority shareholders’interests;14
th in the reliability of police services; 14
th in the ethical 
behaviour of firms; 14
th in the efficacy of corporate boards; 14
th in the effectiveness of law-making bodies;  
15
th in the strength of auditing and accounting standards; 17
th in irregular payments in public utilities; 17
th in 25 
 
performance in the area of governance in the Global Competitiveness Report relative to 
the World Bank report may be linked to the survey nature of the results. The World Bank 
study is to a greater extent based on hard data. Indeed, Canada appears to do less well in 
international rankings based on surveys of employers than those based on hard data. 
Canadian respondents seem to be more critical of their home country than respondents in 
other countries.   
 
The World Bank report on governance, taken together with the Global 
Competitiveness Report, suggests that a problem may not be the level of regulation, but 
the time-consuming and bureaucratic nature of the process of compliance. For example, 
according to Doing Business 2008, the hours per year necessary to prepare, file, and pay 
corporate taxes, sales taxes, and labour taxes in Canada were higher than in Australia, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, Norway, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and New Zealand, among 
OECD countries. This is corroborated by the findings in the Global Competitiveness 
Report’s survey of foreign investors, which reveals that paying taxes and inefficient 
government bureaucracy are considered the most problematic factors for doing business 
in Canada.  
 
  A third indicator of governance is the Index of Perceptions of Corruption 
produced by Transparency International. This index is available for most countries of the 
world (200 countries in 2007) and is based on surveys of businesspeople. Canada does 
very well in this governance measure, suggesting that corruption is not perceived as a 
significant problem in this country. In 2007, Canada ranked 9
th out of 180 countries and 
first in the G-7 (Table 16). Over the ten year period from 1998 to 2007, Canada’s average 
ranking was tenth. 
 
  To conclude, both the World Bank and Transparency International rank Canada 
high in terms of governance, in the top 5 or 10 per cent of countries. The World 
Economic Forum places Canada at a somewhat lower rank, in the top 20 per cent. While 
there is always room for improvement, poor governance is unlikely to deter FDI from 






                                                                                                                                                 
the business cost of corruption; 17
th in irregular payments in tax collection; 18
th in irregular payments in 
public contracts; 18
th in judicial independence; 19
th in irregular payments in exports and imports; 20
th in 
protection by the law of property rights; 20
th in irregular payment in judicial decisions; 27
th in bribes for 
influencing laws, policies, regulations, or decrees;  28
th in the impact of nepotism;  29
th in the public trust of 
politicians; 29
th in the business costs of crime and violence; 31
st in favoritism of decisions of government 
officials;  33
rd  in  the  diversion  of  public  funds  due  to  corruption;  34
th  in  wastefulness  of  government 
spending; 34
th in the quality of information regarding changes in policies and regulations;  36
th for the costs 
imposed on business by organized crime; 36
th for pervasiveness of illegal donations to political parties; 38
th 
in the burden of government regulation; 47
th impact of legal contributions to political parties on public 
policy; and 74
th in the business costs of terrorism. 26 
 
iv. Macroeconomic Performance 
 
Canadian macroeconomic performance has been strong in recent years, among the 
best in the OECD.
13 Despite a very large exchange rate appreciation, the Canadian 
economy experienced solid GDP growth in recent years (Table 24). The unemployment 
rate, at 6.0 per cent in 2007, is the lowest in since the mid-1970s, reflecting sound 
macroeconomic policies (Table 25). Canada’s economic success in large part reflects high 
commodity prices, which have resulted in improved terms of trade, fuelling incomes and 
domestic demand. Inflation has remained under control (Table 26), and current account 
balances are in surplus. Good macroeconomic conditions contribute to a favourable 
climate for foreign investment, and the strong macroeconomic performance will 
contribute to Canada’s ability to attract FDI. 
 
v. Public Finances 
 
Canada’s public finances are very sound, being among the best, if not the best, in 
the OECD. In the 2007-08 fiscal year ending March 31, 2008 the federal government and 
provincial-territorial governments, in the aggregate, are projected to each be in a surplus 
position equivalent to around 0.5 per cent of GDP (Chart 12). In addition, all individual 
provinces and territories are projected to be in a surplus position, as they were in 2006-
07.  
Canada is expected to have the strongest budgetary position in the G-7 over the 
2007-2009 period (Chart 13). In contrast to the G-7 average of a budgetary deficit 
equivalent to nearly 3 per cent of GDP in 2007, Canada recorded a surplus of over 1 per 
cent of GDP. The contrast between the fiscal position of Canada and the United States in 
2007 is particularly striking given the many similarities between the two economies: a 1.2 
per cent total government surplus versus a 2.9 per cent deficit.  
 
The Canadian government has been in a surplus position since the 1996-97 fiscal 
year. This situation has resulted in a massive fall in the debt/GDP ratio, plummeting from 
nearly 70 per cent in 1995-96 to 30 per cent in 2007-2008 (Chart 14). The provincial-
territorial debt/GDP ratio has also fallen from nearly 30 per cent in 1999-2000 to less 
than 20 per cent. Canada now has by far the lowest total government net debt/GDP ratio 
in the G7 on  a national accounts basis (Chart 15) and ranks in the top half among OECD 
countries behind countries such as Norway, Finland, Sweden and Australia. At around 20 
per cent of GDP in 2008, it is less than half the G-7 average of 49 per cent. The debt-
                                                 
13  Details on recent Canadian macroeconomic performance are provided in OECD (2006b) and IMF 
(2008). The OECD in its 2006 country report on Canada (OECD, 2006:9) states ―The Canadian economy 
has continued to deliver excellent results in nearly all respects.‖ The recent IMF Article 4 report on 
Canada (IMF, 2008) ―commended Canada's impressive macroeconomic track record since the mid-1990s, 
which has been underpinned by sound monetary and fiscal policies and favorable external conditions. 
They welcomed, in particular, the strong GDP growth and declining unemployment, low and stable 
inflation, and consecutive fiscal surpluses with attendant reductions in the federal debt-to-GDP ratio 
achieved during this period.‖ 
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GDP ratio of the G-7 country with the second lowest ratio is around 40 per cent, double 
that of Canada.  
 
To the degree that a firm seeking to make direct investments abroad is influenced 
by the fiscal position of the host country, Canada is a very attractive location for FDI.   
 
Chart 12: Federal and Provincial-Territorial Budgetary Balances (Public Accounts Basis) 
 
Source: 2008 Federal Budget, Chart A1.1 
 
Chart 13: Total Government Financial Balances
1 (National Accounts Basis) 
 






Chart 14: Total Government Financial Balances (Public Accounts Basis) 
Source:2008 
Federal Budget, Chart A1.5 
 
Chart 15: Total Government Net Debt (National Accounts Basis) 
 
Source: 2008 Federal Budget, Chart A1.8 
 
vi. Labour Market Flexibility 
 
Everything else being equal, firms prefer a flexible labour force over a non-
flexible labor force as it facilitates the reallocation of workers and lowers costs. A country 29 
 
with a high degree of labour market rigidity therefore may be a less attractive location for   
FDI than a country with a flexible labour market.
14   
 
Both the World Bank and the OECD have developed methodologies to estimate 
a country’s degree of labour market flexibility. Both measures show that Canada’s labour 
market is relatively flexible compared to that of other countries. 
 
The World Bank, in its annual report Doing Business, produces an index of the 
ease of doing business in 177 countries. One of the ten components, or domains, of the 
index is entitled ―employing workers.‖ This sub-index can be considered a measure of 
labour flexibility.  
 
In the 2008 report Canada ranked 19
th out of 177 countries on this variable, 6
th 
among OECD countries, and 3
rd in the G-7 (Table 17). The ―employing workers‖ domain 
is composed of three components: firing costs (cost of advance notice requirements, 
severance payments, and penalties for terminating a redundant worker, measured in 
weeks of salary); nonwage labour costs (social security payments and payroll taxes 
associated with hiring an employee, expressed as a percentage of the worker’s salary); 
and the rigidity of employment index (composed of three sub-indices – difficulty of 
hiring, rigidity of hours, and difficulty of firing). It is the latter index that is particularly 
relevant for international comparisons of labour flexibility   
 
 
                                                 
14 Nicolletti et al. (2003) found that host countries in which employment protection legislation is stricter than in their 




nd among G-7 nations and 3
rd in the OECD in the overall rigidity 
of employment index. For the difficulty of hiring sub-index, Canada received a score of 
11 on an index from 0 to 100 (0 reflects no rigidity and 100 complete rigidity). This 
placed Canada 7
th among OECD countries (along with eight other countries) and 3
rd in G-
7 (equal with the United Kingdom). For both the rigidity of hours index and the difficulty 
of firing index Canada scored 0 on an index from 0 to 100, placing Canada first (4 other 
OECD countries also received this score for the rigidity of hours index and 2 countries for 
the difficulty of firing index.)  
 
Canada ranked 3
rd in non-wage labour cost of salary in the G-7 and 7
th in the 
OECD. Canada performs well in terms of overall labour market flexibility, beating the 
United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and France. Among OECD countries, only the United 
States, Australia and Denmark, New Zealand and Japan performed better than Canada in 
this category.    
   
Work done at the OECD is consistent with the World Bank results that Canada’s 
labour market exhibits a high degree of flexibility.
15 The OECD index of employment 
protection legislation ranked Canada third out of 30 OECD countries in 2003 (Chart 16). 
Only the United States and the United Kingdom scored higher. Canada’s index was 1.1 
based on 0-6 scale where 0 is no protection and 6 is complete protection. Canada scored 
well in all three components of the index: protection against individual dismissals, 
regulation of temporary employment, and regulation on collective dismissals. 
 
  To conclude, Canada has been and remains an attractive country from the point of 
view of firms who place a high value on labour market flexibility in their decisions on the 
location of FDI.   
   
vii. Quality of Life 
 
The quality of life in a country is an important, though often implicit, factor 
influencing FDI location. Naturally, foreign investors are concerned not only about the 
performance of their businesses, but also about the quality of expatriate life.  Lifestyle 
factors may therefore tip the balance in favour of one country over others perceived to 
have similar investment conditions.   
 
The most widely known measure of well-being is the United Nation’s 
Development Program’s Human Development Index (HDI). This measure combines 
social and economic well-being into a composite index that measures countries’ 
achievements in health, knowledge, and standard of living (GDP per capita). In the most 
recent report (UNDP, 2007) based on data for 2005, Canada ranked 4
th among 177 
nations in the Human Development Index (Chart 17). Canada has consistently ranked at 
or near the top in the HDI since 1975 (Chart 18).  
 
                                                 








The HDI captures objective measures of quality of life or well-being. Subjective 
rankings of quality of life across countries are also needed for a comprehensive 
assessment of both aspects of well-being. Canada also ranks high in international 
subjective measures of quality of life. For example, the first world map of happiness 
created by Adrian White (2007) ranked Canada 10
th in the world and 1
st among G7 
nations in terms of the happiness of its citizens (Table 18).
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Finally, it is worth noting that the perception of quality of life in a country 
according to its own inhabitants might greatly diverge from that of potential foreign 
investors.  In Canada’s case, anecdotal evidence might suggest that our harsh winters are 
detrimental to a foreigner’s positive perception of the quality of life in Canada, even 
though most Canadians consider ice and snow part of the Canadian identity. 
   
viii. Overall Business Environment and Climate for Entrepreneurship  
 
  Decisions on direct foreign investment are ultimately made by executives in 
multinational corporations, taking into account not only the fundamental drivers of FDI, 
but also the overall business environment or climate in which the FDI will operate. 
Foreign firms prefer a country with an environment favourable to business to one where 
the climate is not favourable. 
 
  A number of organizations publish reports on the overall attractiveness of a 
country’s business climate to foreign investors.  These reports include the Global 
Competitiveness Report produced by the World Economic Forum, the World 
Competitiveness Yearbook produced by IMD Business School, the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor 2007 compiled by researchers at Babson College and London 
Business School, Doing Business 2008 produced by the World Bank, Competitive 
Alternatives produced by KPMG, and the FDI Confidence Index compiled by the 
consultancy A.T. Kearney Ltd.  
 
  The rankings contained in these reports must generally be viewed with caution, as 
they incorporate perceptions of foreign investors, which may be subject to quick revision 
based on new information or gut feeling. Not surprisingly, Canada receives a wide range 
of scores in these international rankings. 
 
  The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) 2007 provides insight into 
international trends in entrepreneurship and factors that affect the rate of new business 
formation for 42 countries. The key indicator used is early-stage entrepreneurial activity 
rate (TEA rate) – i.e. the prevalence rate of people who are involved in entrepreneurial 
activity as nascent entrepreneurs or the owners of new businesses.
17  
                                                 
16 The report was based on a meta-analysis of the findings of over 100 different studies around the world, which 
questioned 80,000 people worldwide to map out subjective well-being. 
17 New business formation rates exhibit a U-shape, with low-income countries exhibiting high early-stage 
entrepreneurial activity, middle-income countries exhibiting lower early-stage entrepreneurial activity, and early-stage 
entrepreneurial activity rising again for high-income countries. 33 
 
    The overall level of early stage entrepreneurial activity in Canada was relatively 
high, with Canada ranking 7
th out of 21 high income nations. Australia, Iceland, the 
United States, Ireland, Norway and Spain were the only high-income countries ranking 
higher than Canada in terms of TEA rates.  Canada also displays a healthy 
entrepreneurial attitude compared to other countries studied, ranking fourth among high 
income countries in terms of high-growth expectation entrepreneurial activity (measured 
as the prevalence of new and nascent entrepreneurs who expect their business to employ 
at least 20 people in 5 years time). Moreover, Canada ranked fifth among high-income 
countries in terms of innovation-oriented entrepreneurial activity (measured as the 
percentage of early-stage entrepreneurs who believe that they offer a product or service 
that is new to some or all customers, and that there are few or no businesses offering the 
same product).
18   
 
  The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor’s Red Tape Index ranked Canada 21
st out 
of 42 countries in terms of regulatory burden for starting a business. This index was 
based on the survey of experts about the regulatory regime for starting a business in their 
country, and revealed that experts in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand considered 
their regulatory regimes to be negative, even though these countries were among those 
with the lightest red tape according to the World Bank Report noted earlier. It is difficult 
to reconcile these divergent results. 
 
   The World Bank report Doing Business 2008 provides international comparisons 
of the ease of doing business based on hard data for 178 countries. Quantitative indicators 
of regulations that enhance business activity, and those that constrain it, are provided,   
spanning regulations in 10 stages of a business’s life: starting a business, dealing with 
licenses, employing workers (discussed earlier), registering property, getting credit, 
protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts, and closing 
a business.  
 
  In 2008, Canada ranked 7
th in the overall ―ease of doing business,‖ behind 
Singapore, New Zealand, United States, Hong Kong, Denmark, and the United Kingdom 
(Table 19). Canada performed particularly well in the category ―starting a business‖ 
(which considers all standard procedures that a small- to medium-size company needs to 
complete in order to start operations legally), in which it was ranked 2
nd, behind Australia.  
Canada also did well in three other indicators: closing a business (fourth), protecting 
investors (fifth), and seventh in getting credit (seventh).
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  The World Bank’s Doing Business series, produced annually, is generally more 
reliable than the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, as they are based on actual 
regulations and processes rather than relying on the opinions of experts alone (although to 
some extent, the World Bank rankings do reflect the opinions of experts in the fields). 
                                                 
18 The GEM results should be viewed cautiously, as there are some methodological issues. For example, sampling 
methods vary greatly from country to country. The United Kingdom has a reasonable sample size, the United States has 
a very small sample for the size of its economy, and the Canadian sample is drawn 80 percent from the province of 
Quebec and is therefore not indicative of the country as a whole. 
19 In the other six indicators Canada’s ranking ranged from 19
th to 43
rd: employing workers (19
th), paying taxes (25
th), 
dealing with licenses (26
th), trading across borders (39




  In its FDI Confidence Index, the consulting firm A.T. Kearney publishes the 
results of an annual survey of major companies regarding their foreign direct investment 
intentions and their views on candidate countries.  In 2005, Canada dropped from 16
th to 
21
st   place in the index (out of 68 countries), which was its lowest recorded ranking 
(Table 20). The only reasons provided were (1) a drop in Canada’s attractiveness among 
U.S. investors, who ranked Canada their 8
th most preferred FDI location in 2005, down 
from 4
th place in 2004, and (2) a general decline of interest in the Canadian market 
among global manufacturing and financial services investors. The A.T. Kearney rankings 
appear to be quite volatile, affected by short term factors, and do not provide much 
insight into the reasons for Canada’s changes in the rankings. The results should therefore 
be viewed very cautiously. 
 
The Economist Intelligence Unit rates the business environments of 82 countries 
on the basis of 91 indicators including indicators of macroeconomic stability, labour 
market flexibility, the quality and quantity of infrastructure, and the regulatory 
environment.  The scores take values between one and ten and allow countries to be 
ranked according to the overall attractiveness of their business environments to potential 
investors.  In the 2008 rankings, Canada places fourth with a score of 8.72.  (Denmark’s 
score of 8.78 places it first, while Finland and Singapore rank second and third.)    
Canada’s rank represents an improvement over its fifth-place rank in 2003.   
 
The most comprehensive analysis of business environment is found in the annual 
publication The Global Competitiveness Report 2006-2007: Creating an Improved 
Business Environment, produced by the World Economic Forum. The Global 
Competitiveness Index groups factors that determine productivity and competitiveness 
into nine categories – institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomy, health and primary 
education, higher education and training, market efficiency, technological readiness, 
business sophistication, and innovation. It defines the first four categories as basic 
requirements; the fifth, sixth, and seventh as efficiency enhancers; and the final two 
categories as innovation factors. The study is largely based on survey responses of 
domestic and foreign investors to capture qualitative aspects of the business environment, 
but it also relies on some hard data to compile its country-rankings.  
 
Overall, Canada ranked 16th out of 125 countries in the 2006-2007 Global 
Competitiveness Report, down from 13th in the 2005-2006 report. For the four basic 
requirement categories Canada ranked 13
th overall, placing 21
st in institutions, 13
th in 
infrastructure, 32
nd in the macro-economy, and 2
nd in health and primary education. For 
the three efficiency enhancers Canada ranked 15
th, placing 17
th in higher education and 
training, 7
th in market efficiency, and 17
th in technological readiness. For the innovation 
factors Canada ranked 16
th, placing 18
th in business sophistication and 13
th in innovation.   
 
A second comprehensive assessment of overall competitiveness is provided by the 
World Competitiveness Yearbook published by the IMD Business School in Geneva. 
Canada’s overall ranking was 10
th out of 55 countries in 2007 (Table 22). Of the four 35 
 
components of the index, Canada ranked 11
th in government efficiency, 12
th in 
infrastructure and business efficiency, and 13
th in economic performance.
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  KPMG’s Competitive Alternatives: 2008 Edition provides model-based 
comparisons of business costs across nine affluent countries and Mexico, a newly 
industrialized country.  The comparisons rely on data collected from 136 cities and 
seventeen industries within four industry sectors: manufacturing, research and 
development, software, and corporate services.  Using this data, KPMG’s cost model 
produces, for each country, estimates of various location-sensitive business costs 
including the costs of labour, transportation, utilities, and taxes.  The United States is 
used as a baseline; its business costs are assigned a value of 100.0, and costs in other 
countries are indexed to that base.  Since firms prefer to invest in locations with low costs 
rather than high costs, all else being equal, these business cost measures provide 
information about the relative attractiveness of countries’ business environments from a 
cost perspective. 
 
  Summary Table 3 contains the business cost index values for all countries in the 
KPMG study, for four industry sectors and for the overall national economies in 2008.  In 
each case, Canada compares favourably to most of the other countries.  Overall, Canadian 
business costs take an index value of 99.4, on par with costs in the United States and 
Australia and lower than those in all the other affluent countries.  Only Mexico has lower 
overall business costs than Canada, which is no surprise; Mexico is a newly industrialized 
country with low labour costs, and labour costs (including wages and salaries, statutory 




Summary Table 3: Business Costs by Country and Industry Sector, 2008   
  Manufacturing  Software  Research and 
Development 
Corporate 
Services  Overall 
Mexico  83.9  69.5  68.9  69.3  79.5 
Canada  99.9  96.5  96.3  105.8  99.4 
United States  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Australia  99.5  99.7  100.5  109.6  100.2 
France  102.3  105.0  100.4  121.2  103.6 
United Kingdom  104.9  111.4  107.5  123.2  107.1 
Netherlands  105.5  109.6  102.1  132.2  107.3 
Italy  104.8  113.9  109.1  129.8  107.9 
Japan  111.1  109.3  117.6  159.9  114.3 
Germany  111.9  127.2  121.7  141.9  116.8 
Note: Business costs are reported as an index with US = 100.0.   
Source: KPMG (2008) 
 
 
                                                 
20 See Table 23 for Canada’s ranking for the different variables in each component. 36 
 
sensitive costs for manufacturing firms and 79 to 88 per cent for non-manufacturing 
firms.  Canada also ranks second behind Mexico in terms of business costs in the 
software and R&D sectors.  Within the R&D sector, Canada has particular advantages in 
biotechnology and product testing, with cost index values of 98.6 and 94.2—both placing 
Canada in second place behind only low-cost Mexico. 
 
Canada ranks third in the manufacturing sector, although the differences between 
Canada and the second- and fourth-place countries, Australia and the United States, are 
negligible.  In the particularly important automotive industry, Canada’s cost index value 
is 100.2; this ranks Canada fourth in the industry with costs once again essentially the 
same as those in the United States.   
 
In the corporate services sector, Canada’s index value of 105.8 is good enough for 
a third-place ranking, although it is 5.8 points higher than the second-place United States.   
 
  Since 2006, Canada’s cost competitiveness has decreased relative to the United 
States but increased relative to the rest of the affluent countries.  Canada’s cost index 
value increased by 4.9 points over the two-year period, from 94.5 to 99.4, but this was the 
smallest increase experienced by any of the countries; the next smallest was Japan’s 7.4 
point increase.  These trends reflect the influence of exchange rates in the business cost 
measurements.  The US dollar has depreciated against the Canadian dollar, the UK 
pound, and the Euro since 2006 and the costs of doing business have therefore declined in 
the United States relative to the rest of the world.  Since the long-run value of the 
Canada-US exchange rate is estimated to be about $0.80-$0.85 USD per $1.00 CAD, 
there is reason to think that Canada’s cost competitiveness should improve in the future 
as the Canadian dollar returns to its long-run value.
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  While there is always room for improvement, the KPMG study does not identify 
any particularly problematic aspects of Canada’s business cost environment.  Canada is 
ranked third in total labour costs per employee.  In terms of the percentage of a firm’s 
payroll that goes toward statutory plans and other benefits, Canada ranks first and second, 
respectively.  Canada ranks second in both electricity costs and telecommunications 
costs, behind only the United States.  Canada has a lower effective income tax rate for 
manufacturing firms than any of the other affluent countries in the study.  Neither the 
federal government nor most of the provincial governments impose capital taxes.  
Environmental regulation is becoming an increasingly important factor in investment 
decision-making, and Canada ranks first in terms of the impact of environmental laws on 
cost competitiveness. One potential area of concern is property taxes; Canada ranks 
seventh in the cost of property tax per square foot of building space.  On the whole, 
however, the cost of doing business does not appear to be a major impediment to FDI 
inflows into Canada. 
 
  Indeed, based on the above rankings, it seems fair to conclude that Canada does 
not have a major problem with respect to its overall business environment, although there 
may be room for improvement in some areas.  
                                                 
21 For estimates of the long-run Canada/US PPP exchange rate, see OECD (2008). 37 
 
Exhibit 1 
  Canada’s Performance on OECD Product Market Regulation Indicators 
      (0 to 5 from least to most restrictive) 
 
            Score     Ranking out of 28 OECD 
                  Countries 
 
          1998     2003     1998    2003 
State Control        1.8            1.7          4    8 
Barriers to Entrepreneurship    1.0       0.8          1    1 
Barriers to Trade and Investment        1.3       1.1        13    22 
Overall Product Market Regulation  1.4       1.2          4    8 
 
Note: The state control domain includes sub-domains on public ownership and involvement in business 
operations; the barriers to entrepreneurship domain includes sub-domains on administrative barriers to 
start-ups, regulatory and administrative opacity, and barriers to competition; the barriers to trade and 
investment domain includes explicit barriers to trade and investment and other barriers.   
 
Source: Conway, Janod and Nicoletti (2005: Tables 21-24).  
 
 
One specific aspect of the business environment is product market regulation 
(Sharpe and Currie, 2008). OECD research has found that these regulations curb 
competition and have a negative and significant effect on FDI.
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  Exhibit 1 shows Canada’s performance on OECD product market regulation 
indicators, which include state control, barriers to entrepreneurship, barriers to trade and 
investment, and overall product market regulation. In 2003, Canada ranked 8
th among 
OECD countries in terms of overall product market regulation, down from 4
th in 1998. In 
absolute terms, however, product market barriers were low and on a downward trend. On 
a scale of 0 to 5 where 0 is the least restrictive and 6 the most restrictive, Canada 
registered below 2 in all three policy domains as well as for the overall indicator. In all 
three policy domains, Canada moved slightly to a less restrictive product regulatory 
environment between 1998 and 2003.  
 
                                                 
22 Nicoletti et al. (2003:55) find that as product market regulation in the host country becomes more restrictive than 
regulation in the home country, outstocks of the latter decrease. In other words, product market regulations make the 
host country less attractive to international investors located in countries where regulations are less restrictive. 38 
 
B. Canada’s Relative Weaknesses 
 
i. Productivity Trends 
 
  As noted earlier in the report, the Canadian economy has performed well on 
almost all economic indicators. The one area where Canada has performed poorly, from 
both historical and international perspectives, is productivity growth. Ironically, as 
discussed above, productivity growth is of paramount importance for international 
competitiveness and future living standards. Not surprisingly, both the OECD and IMF 
reports highlight this area of weakness and recommend policies to rectify it.
23 
 
Canada’s productivity growth has also been very weak relative to that experienced in 
the United States. The growth rate of business sector output per hour in Canada has been 
1.0 per cent per year since 2000, only around 40 per cent of the 2.6 per cent rate recorded 
south of the border (Chart 19).
24 Based on Industry Canada benchmark labour 
productivity level estimates (Rao, Tang and Wang, 2004), Canada’s lagging labour 
productivity growth has resulted in the widening of the business sector labour 
productivity gap from 17 percentage points in 2000 (83 per cent the US level) to 26 
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Chart 19: Business Sector Output per Hour Growth in Canada and the United States (average 




Sources: GDP in chained dollars and total hours worked from the Productivity and Costs Program of the Bureau of Labor Statistics
for the United States, and annual averages of quarterly estimates from the Productivity Program Database of Statistics Canada for 
Canada.  
 
                                                 
23  The OECD country report (2006:10) says that a challenge for all levels of government is to raise productivity and 
that boosting productivity growth depends on improving the overall business environment. For an OECD perspective 
on Canada, also see Cotis (2006). 
24 For a detailed recent analysis of the causes of weak productivity growth in Canada since 2000, see Sharpe and 




From a historical perspective, Canada’s relative productivity performance has been 
very weak. Over the 1973-2006 period, output per hour in Canada advanced at only a 1.2 
per cent average annual  rate (Chart 19B and Table 26), down from 3.0 per cent in the 
1950-73 period, a drop of nearly two thirds.  
     




Since 1973 Canada has had the third lowest rate of growth in output per hour 
among 23 OECD countries, with only New Zealand and Switzerland doing worse (Chart 
19C). This resulted in Canada’s level of output per hour falling from third highest in the 
OECD in 1950 and in 1973 to 16
th in 2006. 
 
The causes of the fall-off in labour productivity growth in Canada after 2000 are 
still poorly understood. Possible explanations include measurement problems; weak 
productivity growth in resource industries exploiting poorer quality resources such as the 
oil sands; weak ICT investment; a failure to exploit advanced technologies; and weak 
wage growth leading to a slower rate of substitution of capital for labour (Rao, Sharpe 
and Smith, 2005 and Sharpe and Arsenault, 2008). There is no evidence that trends 
related to FDI have been responsible for the weakness of labour productivity growth.  
 
This inability of productivity analysts to provide a definitive account of the 
reasons for Canada’s poor productivity growth makes the development of policies to 
reverse this situation more difficult. If we knew what was wrong, we could take action to 
rectify the problem. But we do know that technological change and investment are 
fundamental drivers of productivity growth. Thus policies that focus on these two areas 
can be expected to have a positive impact on productivity growth.  
 
  The importance of productivity for FDI attraction is unclear. Foreign firms 
considering investing in a host country normally would be expected to assume 
responsibility for the productivity performance of their operations since they control all 
aspects of the production process. From this perspective, they may not be particularly 
concerned by a country’s poor productivity growth as they feel they will not be affected. 41 
 
But if the productivity performance is directly linked to certain negative aspects of the 
business environment, such as an excessively adversarial labour relations climate or 
negative worker attitudes to productivity, then FDI may indeed be deterred. Fortunately, 
Canada’s mediocre productivity performance has not been linked to specific business 
environment factors that are harmful to productivity. 
     
ii. R&D and Innovation 
 
The level of R&D in a country is a key determinant of innovation and an 
innovative economy is attractive to FDI. Indeed, an OECD study on FDI found that the 
overall level of R&D expenditure in the host country increases its attractiveness for total 
inward FDI (Nicoletti et al., 2003:48).While Canada had the highest public R&D 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP among G7 nations in 2005, Canadian business R&D 
expenditure as a share of GDP was 6
th amongst the G7 countries (Chart 20), and down 
from 5




Canada’s performance in attracting foreign R&D expenditures also lagged in 
comparison to other countries in the G7.  Expenditures on R&D of foreign affiliates 
(adjusted for inflation) in Canada were the 2
nd lowest among G7 countries in 2003 (the 
most recent year for which data are available), although expenditures on R&D by foreign 
affiliates as a percentage of total R&D expenditures by enterprises was the 2
nd highest.
 25  
                                                 
25 Data on R&D expenditures are from OECD (2007b).  42 
 
Moreover, India and China are making rapid progress in the area of R&D and are likely to 
be major players in the future. For example, in 2005, China became the 3rd largest R&D 
spender world-wide (in purchasing power terms), after the United States and Japan 
(OECD 2007d).  In addition, with its large pool of scientists and engineers, China could 
become an attractive location for FDI in R&D if its WTO membership pushes it to 
develop a secure intellectual property rights regime and legal framework.  While R&D 
expenditures in India are not significant in the world stage, it is high among developing 
nations.  India has become a major player in computer software development, and is 
attracting some R&D in IT with its large pool of computer engineers and lower pay scales 
(Conference Board of Canada 2004).
  Both countries are strong competitors to Canada for 
attracting FDI in R&D-intensive industries. 
 
 The 2006-2007 Global Competitiveness Report ranked Canada 13
th out of 125 
countries in innovation, noting that Canada’s comparative advantages in this category lie 
in the availability of scientists and engineers, utility patents, quality of scientific research 
institutions, and university/industry research collaboration, while its comparative 
disadvantages lie in government procurement of technology products and company 
spending on R&D.  Though Canada performs well on innovation in the 2006-2007 Global 
Competitiveness Report, it is interesting to note that its ranks in technological readiness 
(i.e. the quickness with which an economy adopts existing technology to increase the 
productivity of its industries) and business sophistication (measured by the quantity and 
quality of local suppliers, well-developed production processes, and the extent to which 
companies produce the most sophisticated products)  are 17
th and 18
th, respectively, out of 
125 countries.  For Canada to build its attractiveness as a destination for investment, it 
will have to effectively deal with increased competition for foreign investment (in R&D 
and otherwise), and issues pertaining to technological readiness and business 
sophistication. 
 
In contract to the relatively high ranking in innovation provided by the Global 
Competitiveness Report, the Conference Board of Canada (2007) gave Canada a grade of 
D for innovation, ranking it fourth to last in a 17 country comparator group. 
 
As was the case for productivity, the importance of innovation, and particularly 
business sector R&D, for FDI location decisions is unclear. Foreign firms considering 
investing in a host country normally would be expected to assume responsibility for their 
own innovative activities including R&D. From this perspective, they may not be 
particularly concerned by a country’s poor business sector R&D performance as they feel 
they will not be affected by it. They control their own R&D budget. They might be more 
concerned with the overall level of public R&D and the potential spillovers from this type 
of R&D to the business sector, and the supply of highly skilled labour. As noted, Canada 
does well on both of these indicators. 







   
  The availability of quality infrastructure positively affects inward FDI, as it lowers 




  The Global Competitiveness Report 2006-2007 ranked Canada 13
th out of 125 
countries in this category, taking into account the availability and quality of energy, 
transport, and telecommunication services infrastructure. There are indications that the 
quality and quantity of Canada’s physical infrastructure are slipping compared to some 
other countries. For example, Germany, France, Denmark, Japan and Netherlands, which 
ranked behind Canada in 2000 according to the OECD study “The Influence of Policies 




Based on surveys of investors, the Global Competitiveness Report ranked Canada 
14
th in terms of railroad infrastructure development, 16
th in the quality of port 
infrastructure, 17
th in the quality of air transport infrastructure, 18
th in the quality of 
electricity supply, 16
th in the quality of roads, and 16
th in the quality of telephone/fax 
infrastructure, out of 125 countries world-wide. 
 
A slightly older survey of global investors conducted by the Conference Board of 
Canada in 2003/2004 revealed that 80 per cent of those surveyed thought that the overall 
business infrastructure in Canada had a negative or strongly negative impact on their 
decision to invest.  It is important to keep in mind that all surveys are subjective and 
represent opinions that may be quickly revised based on new information.  However, the 
overarching message from the analysis of various sources is that Canada’s traditional 




High business taxes reduce the return on investment, which in turn reduces 
domestic and foreign investment in a country. Based on a survey of the literature, de 
Mooji and Enderveen (2006) find that a one percentage point reduction in the corporate 
tax rate raises foreign investment by 2.1 per cent.  Their focus is on the effect of taxes on 
the amount of investment rather than firms’ decisions to locate in a specific country.    
 
Statutory income tax rates on individuals and businesses are relatively high in 
Canada according to international standards. Historically, tax revenue as a percentage of 
                                                 
26 Nicoletti et al. (2003:58) found that infrastructure improves the overall attractiveness of a host country 
for international investors when the potential endogeneity of FDI is controlled for. 
27 Indeed, Nicoletti et al., 2003:39) find that in 2000 Canada ranked 6
th out of 28 OECD countries in the 
quality and quantity of infrastructure in transport, telecommunications and electricity. Only Norway, 




GDP in Canada has consistently been over the OECD average. Recognizing the 
importance of a competitive business tax system in creating a healthy business 
environment, the long-term trend in developed countries has been to reduce statutory 
corporate income tax rates.
 28  Despite a general downward trend, statutory corporate tax 
rates in Canada during 2006 were much higher than the OECD average. However, this 
does not say much about how taxes affect specific investment decisions of businesses.  
The extent to which taxes impinge upon investment decisions is better understood through 
the marginal effective tax rate (METR) – i.e. the share of pre-tax return on capital that 
would be required to cover taxes.  
 
According to the CD Howe Institute (2007), the marginal effective tax rate on 
capital for large and medium-sized corporations in Canada in 2007 (taking into account 
corporate tax rates, and other capital-related taxes) was 30.9 per cent, the 11
th highest 
among 80 countries (Table 21). Relative to G-7 countries, Canada was fifth. The United 
States, Germany, France, and Japan had a higher METR (Chart 21). Canada’s METR has 





To improve Canada’s business tax competitiveness, improvements in the structure 
of the tax system will have to be made.  Some examples of structural improvements are: 
harmonizing provincial retail sales tax with GST in the five provinces where they are not 
                                                 
28  The analysis of statutory corporate tax rates is from Department of Finance Canada (2006:73-74). 45 
 
harmonized—Ontario, B.C., Saskatchewan, P.E.I. and Manitoba—so as to effectively 
eliminate retail sales taxes on business inputs and capital goods; eliminating provincial 
capital taxes on productive investment; reviewing capital cost allowance rates so as to 
ensure a fair tax burden on investment; and making the tax system more neutral across 
firm size.  The Canadian government has already announced a business tax relief plan in 
its 2006 budget and in its long-term economic plan Advantage Canada, released in the fall 
of 2006.  Advantage Canada aimed at gaining an METR advantage for Canada over the 
United States by 2011, and establishing the lowest METR among G7 countries in the 
future by ensuring that capital cost allowance rates reflect the useful life of assets, and by 
encouraging provinces to eliminate capital taxes and harmonize provincial retail taxes 
with the GST.  
 
Chart 22 shows the planned level of the METR in Canada in 2012, reflecting 
developments up to the February 2008 budget and given the government’s future 
objective related to GST harmonization with the provinces and future cuts to the 
corporate income tax. The rate is 16.4 per cent, around half the current rate. The 






  The World Bank also publishes an indicator of the total tax rate (TTR) paid by 
businesses in 178 countries as part of its Doing Business project (World Bank, 2008a). 
For the most recent survey, the standardized business was assumed to be located in the 
largest city in each country (Toronto in Canada) and 2006 tax rules were applied. The 
study found that Canada’s TTR stood at 45.9 per cent, 12
th among the 24 OECD 
countries covered and 99
th among the 178 countries under study (Table 22). The TTR can 
be divided into three components: profit taxes, labor tax contributions and other taxes. In 
2006, Canada still had relatively high profit taxes, with provincial and federal profit taxes 
adding up to 26 per cent in 2006, ranking only 18
th among 24 OECD countries. While 
Canada had relatively low labour taxes at 7.6 per cent (ranking 7
th in the OECD), this 
advantage was offset by other taxes such as property taxes (6.5 per cent) and fuel taxes 
(0.9 per cent) (Table 22a).  In the ―Other Taxes‖ component, Canada (7.6 per cent) 
ranked second to last just before the United States (9.5 per cent) among the 24 OECD 
countries surveyed.   
 
v. Exchange Rates  
 
  Theoretically, the effect of nominal exchange-rates on FDI involves two opposing 
effects (Nicoletti et al, 2003:48). For given relative prices, an exchange-rate depreciation 
in the home country reflects a pure valuation effect, with the US dollar value of assets 
held by home country in the host country increasing. It also creates an asset effect, 
reducing the attractiveness of investment in the host country as its assets become more 
expensive. A second factor affecting FDI is exchange-rate volatility, which may increase 
the risk premia on the returns to FDI. The effect of exchange-rate volatility on FDI 
depends on whether a firm sells its output in the host country or abroad, and whether it 
finances its capital at home or abroad. Ultimately, the effect of exchange rates and 
exchange-rate volatility on FDI is an empirical question.  
 
The OECD study The Influence of Policies on Trade and FDI by Nicoletti et al. 
(2003) finds some evidence that reduced bilateral and multilateral (import weighted) 
exchange-rate volatility positively affects inward FDI position of host countries. The 
effect of exchange rates on FDI is ambiguous, with estimated effects changing sign 
according the bilateral FDI specifications. Recent literature analyzing Canada’s FDI 
position barely touches on the issue of the recent exchange rate appreciation and its effect 
on FDI stocks and inflows.  
 
One might have expected that the strong appreciation of the value of the Canadian 
dollar vis-a-vis the US dollar since 2002 would have dampened FDI inflows, particularly 
from countries whose currencies are closely linked to the US dollar. This does not appear 
to have happened. As noted earlier in the paper, FDI inflows into Canada since 2002 have 
soared, including inflows from the United States. There appears to be little link between 





vi. FDI Regulation  
 
The Investment Canada Act (ICA) is the regulatory framework used by the 
government to review large-scale foreign investments in Canada which exceed a certain 
financial threshold.  Review of foreign investments at a lower threshold is required in 
financial services, transportation services, uranium and culture.  A prospective foreign 
investor must demonstrate to the government that the intended transaction is of net benefit 
to Canada.  The criteria used are: 1) effect of the investment on the nature and level of 
economic activity in Canada, 2) degree of participation by Canadians, 3) factors related to 
productivity, efficiency, technological development, innovation and variety, 4) 
competition in Canada, 5) compatibility with national industrial, economic and cultural 
policies, and 6) Canada’s ability to compete in world markets.
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There is no specific weighting to the above-mentioned factors in the net benefit 
test, providing the Minister of Industry with discretion to decide if the FDI serves 
Canadian interests as they change over time.  This brings up issues of the lack of 
predictability about how the net benefit test will be applied and what conditions have to 
be met, and the lack of transparency about the undertakings of foreign investors to meet 
net benefit tests (due to reasons of commercial confidentiality).  In addition, Canada has 
sector-specific policies on foreign investment in certain sectors.  For example, regulation 
placing limits on foreign ownership are present in telecommunications, transport, 
broadcasting, cultural industries, and uranium production.  Restrictions on operational 
freedom are also present in protected sectors, such as length of stay of non-resident 
executives, and regulation in the financial sector, wherein residents are required to form a 
majority of the board of directors of a domestic financial institution, and must form one 
half of the board of directors of a financial institution that is a subsidiary of a foreign 
parent.  According to the OECD, Canada’s level of formal restriction to inward FDI in the 
ICA and sectoral investment legislation/policies impede Canada’s ability to attract FDI.  
 
Unsurprisingly, OECD research has found that FDI restrictions have a significant 
negative impact on FDI stocks, with estimates implying that such barriers could be 
depressing FDI stocks between 10 and 80 per cent depending on the restriction considered 
(Nicoletti et al., 2003:49). While Canada has eased its overall level of FDI restrictiveness 
over time, it still has the highest level of restrictions among the G7, and the 2
nd highest 
among original OECD members, after Iceland (Chart 23).  The OECD study The 
Influence of Policies on Trade and FDI by Nicoletti et al. (2003), estimates that the effect 
of bringing FDI restrictions down to the level of the United Kingdom (the least restrictive 
country) could increase Canada’s inward FDI stock by 70 per cent of the average FDI 
stock over the 1990s.   
 
                                                 






Some observers question the validity of OECD measures of FDI restrictiveness, 
and whether they are a true reflection of reality. There are certain limitations 
acknowledged by the OECD in its calculation of FDI restrictions. For example, hidden 
institutional or behavioural barriers and the extent of enforcement of statutory restrictions 
to FDI are difficult to identify and quantify, and are ignored. It is also possible that some 
countries are more transparent in reporting restrictions than others. In that case, 
transparent countries receive higher score, not because they are actually more restrictive, 
but because they report restrictions more completely. All of these factors may contribute 
to an upward bias in the calculations of FDI restrictiveness in Canada.   
 
While FDI regulations in Canada are broadly consistent with the regulations of 
other countries, where electricity, transport, telecommunications and finance are generally 
the most controlled, it is nonetheless an issue of concern.  FDI brings with it many 
benefits, such as new technologies and competition, which help drive productivity growth 
in Canada. With productivity being the long-run determinant of economic growth, and 
Canada's productivity performance lagging behind most OECD countries, re-evaluating 
Canadian FDI regulations to ensure that they support clear policy objectives, with a 
minimum of negative effects on the economy, could be part, albeit a small part, of a 
solution to boosting Canadian productivity levels. 49 
 
 
V. Conclusion: How Can Canada Improve Attractiveness to 
of Global FDI? 
 
           Canada’s share of world FDI has plummeted over the last quarter century. This 
development has not been due to policies or a business environment in Canada that has 
been hostile to FDI. Rather it was due to the opening of many closed parts of the world to 
international capital flows. Canada was an early player in the game of allowing 
unimpeded access to foreign capital, but now other countries such as China are catching 
up.  It is not at all clear that this fall in world FDI share is a problem. Canada’s FDI share 
is roughly comparable with its world GDP share and is third highest in the G-7. 
 
An assessment of how Canada stands on both the fundamental and enabling 
factors influencing FDI location decisions reveals that there is no obvious area where 
Canada is doing particularly poorly. The one area where Canada excels is the quality of 
its natural resources base, as FDI inflows in this area have been very large in recent years.  
 
Despite the overall positive assessment of Canada’s ability to attract FDI, one 
should not be complacent. More FDI, particularly greenfield FDI, would be positive for 
Canada, including a potential contribution to better productivity performance through 
technology transfer. And there are certainly steps Canada can take to make the country 
more attractive to FDI. 
 
  In addition, NAFTA has not proved to be of much help to Canada in attracting 
the foreign direct investment it hoped for. Canada now faces increased competition from 
faster-growing developing economies in Asia, where the size and growth of markets, and 
lower labour costs are proving to be a clear draw for foreign investors. Canada is not yet 
well positioned to fully benefit from the large flows of FDI in today’s global, knowledge-
based economy, or from the increased focus of MNEs on global supply chains. In order to 
become a major player in inward FDI, Canada will have to develop its potential 
comparative advantages, maintain its existing ones, and most importantly, communicate 
these advantages in the face of increased global competition.  
 
A.  Improving the Business Environment 
 
If Canada is to become a better destination of choice for foreign direct investment, 
it must improve its already favourable business environment. The analysis in this paper 
reveals the following areas of improvement: 
 
  Taxes: A competitive tax environment is an important factor in attracting foreign 
investment. While traditional variables such as resource endowments, market size, and 
agglomeration economies have always been recognized as the main factors influencing 
the flows of FDI, economic integration and falling trade barriers have increased the 
importance of taxation in location and sourcing decisions of MNEs. The federal 50 
 
government has already taken steps to improve the business tax environment in Canada, 
although concerns remain about provincial governments reversing this process. 
  
   Overall Regulatory Environment: There is an indication that business concerns 
about regulation in Canada stem from the cost of compliance, rather than the level of 
regulation per se. Improvements need to be made in the administration of regulation, so 
that they can be enforced with minimum cost to businesses. The federal government’s 
―smart regulation‖ initiative is an encouraging step in this direction. 
 
  FDI Regulation: Canadian FDI regulation appears to be extremely high, according to 
OECD calculations. As discussed previously, evidence suggests that Canada could 
substantially increase its stock of FDI by adopting a less stringent regulatory regime, 
similar to that of the United Kingdom. A review of FDI regulation in Canada is required 
to ensure that the current regulatory regime protects Canadian interests efficiently, with 
minimum damage to its world competitiveness. Of course, one must consider the reasons 
why these regulations were first put into place and assess whether or not these reasons 
continue to be valid.  
 
  Labour Productivity: Foreign investors may see weak productivity growth in Cabada 
as indicative on an underlying problem or malaise that would affect them if they chose to 
invest in Canada. To rectify this negative image Canada must improve its labour 
productivity substantially. Suppliers will need to enhance their technological readiness 
(i.e. the quickness with which they adopt existing technology to increase productivity of 
their employees) and upgrade the skills of their workforce. The government can support 
this by tax incentives such as income tax credits for employers and workers to offset 
training costs, and government financial support for technological upgrades.  
 
Trade: It is in Canada’s interest to successfully manage the frequent problems in the 
Canada-U.S. trade relationship, and ensure that FTA/NAFTA provides foreign investors  
with the North American market access it promised 
 
B. Honing Existing Competencies 
 
  Other measures that build on Canada’s existing comparative advantages could be 
taken to improve the country’s performance in attracting foreign investment. These 
include: 
 
  Enhancing Skills and Education: Canada already has the highest proportion of 
working-aged adults with post-secondary degrees among OECD countries. Canada could 
deepen this advantage by ensuring that skills and competencies are developed in technical 
fields, and increasing the proportion of adults that have university degrees. In this regard, 
caution must be exercised in focusing on enrolment rates (quantity) alone. Quality of 
education must be given the highest priority so that there is no quality/quantity trade-off. 
Government programs that support stay-in-school initiatives, provide career counselling, 
offer incentives to Canadian employers and workers to upgrade their skills, and improve 51 
 
immigrant credential recognition processes, would enable Canada to increase its pool of 
highly educated workers with skills that are rewarded in the global marketplace.  
  
  Improving Infrastructure:  While Canada was among countries with the highest 
levels (quality and quantity) of infrastructure in the OECD as of 2000, its position has 
been slipping in recent years. Modernizing physical infrastructure in urban regions, 
highways, airports, ports, and along borders, including maintenance to keep pace with 
normal wear and tear is indispensable to the free flow of goods and services. Sizeable 
public investments in infrastructure will be required if Canada is to maintain this 
traditional advantage. 
 
  Finding Niche Markets: In the absence of advantages of market size, scale of 
production, and labour costs, Canada will have to define and develop its advantages in the 
context of what it can produce efficiently within global supply chains. The analysis of 
existing and potential advantages in Canada points towards a possible specialization in 
high-value, knowledge and technology intensive products and services. Another area of 
specialization could be emerging technologies such as biofuels, genetics, environmental 
technologies, and artificial intelligence.  
   
  Finally, increased global competition for foreign direct investment means that 
Canada will have to effectively communicate its strengths to the world. Being a small 
economy, Canada may be easily overlooked by foreign investors making location choices 
among countries the world over. While honing and developing strengths is important, 
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